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1 Introduction 
 
International mergers and acquisitions have become one of the preferred forms of 
international investment by firms. Latin America offers many opportunities for both 
foreign and local firms to grow within and outside of their traditional markets. 
Development of Latin American countries has largely been driven by their vast supply of 
natural resources, which have been able to provide revenues through export of 
commodities (World Bank, 2010). Six countries in Latin America have an important 
commodity revenue share ranging from 10% to 49% of output over 2004-2008. These six 
countries are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, which generate 
their revenue from agricultural exports, copper, oil, hydrocarbons, mining and 
hydrocarbons, respectively. The 2001 to 2008 high growth in commodity prices led to 
high growth in the commodity rich countries of Latin America (World Bank, 2010).  
As an emerging market, Latin America has also attracted multinational firms 
attempting to enter into a region in which different industries are undergoing 
development, thus leading to increased M&A activity. The seven countries that have seen 
the greatest amount of M&A activity in terms of deal volume have been: Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. From 1990 to 2007, aggregate 
deal volume in the region was $545.5 billion, with 55.4% in domestic M&A deals and 
44.6% in cross-border deals (Figure 1). Of total M&A activity, 32% has been in the 
financial services industry, followed by 28% in technology, media and 
telecommunications, 27% in manufacturing, energy and utilities, 14% in consumer and 
retail and 1% in healthcare (Figure 2). 
With these growth opportunities come significant risk. Crises in Latin America 
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throughout 1990 to 2007 have come with currency and debt crises as well as economic 
instability. Some crises in the region have spread to several countries at the same time. 
Such is the case of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994, which spread to the Southern Cone 
and Brazil. Many of the banking crises in the region have subsequently become systemic 
crisis, such as the ones seen in Argentina in 1991 and 2001, Costa Rica in 1994, Ecuador 
in 1998-2001, Mexico in 1994, Paraguay in 1995, Uruguay in 2002, and Venezuela in 
1994 (World Bank, 2003). Currency crises have been caused by sudden devaluation and 
large exchange rate depreciation making foreign investment more profitable, which often 
leads to higher levels of M&A activity as shown by Aminian, Campart, and Pfister 
(2005) in their study of bi-directional capital flows between Europe and Asia between 
1999 and 2004.   
This paper studies M&A activity in Latin America during the period ranging from 
1990 to 2007. I focus in particular on the effects of crises on M&A activity during my 
sample period. Crises years are years in which there was a systemic banking crisis, 
currency crisis, or debt crisis. An interesting feature of M&A activity is that it often 
comes in waves, which are periods in which M&A activity is clustered around a specific 
time frame (Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu, 2006). Several theories have been put 
forward to explain the reasons behind M&A waves; they look at booming and depressed 
markets led by company managers searching for high returns as they acquire undervalued 
companies or use overvalued stock to make acquisitions. Studies on the determinants of 
M&A activity and cross-border acquisitions have also focused on studying macro 
characteristics of countries, such as openness to trade (e.g. Aminian, Campart, and 
Pfister, 2005), corporate governance levels (e.g. Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and GDP 
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growth (e.g. Aminian, Campart, and Pfister, 2005) and have attempted to explain how 
changes in these variables can affect the number of M&A transaction. In Latin America, 
different countries exhibit different levels of development in terms of their financial 
systems (International American Development Bank, 2007). The development of 
financial systems, in turn, is considered to be the product of the quality of corporate 
governance and investor protection, as shown by La Porta et al. (2002). Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) conclude that volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with 
better accounting standards and shareholder protection by studying M&A deals 
announced in the 1990s and completed by 2002 in 49 major countries.  
The two main competing hypotheses that are put to the test in this study are the 
following: First the   “bargain   hypothesis,”   whereby   M&A   activity   increases during a 
crisis due to the low valuation of target companies. Second, and in opposition to the first 
hypothesis, I test whether M&A activity decreases due to the financial distress of 
potential  buyers  (“financing  constraints” hypothesis) or the financial distress of potential 
targets  (“loss  of  confidence”  hypothesis).   
By looking at M&A activity during crises and non-crises periods it is possible to 
study the fluctuation in M&A levels and thus determine the dynamics of deal activity 
throughout the Latin American region. In addition to looking at overall M&A activity 
levels, both cross-border M&A activity and domestic M&A activity is analyzed 
separately with the purpose of understanding how foreign buyers and domestic buyers 
react to acquisitions in the target countries being studied. 
M&A deal activity throughout various industries is also examined with the 
purpose of understanding how different industries react to crises vs. non-crises years. 
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Results test whether merger waves are being driven by market timing. Additionally, the 
neoclassical argument in which M&A activity is influenced by industry shocks in the 
Latin American region is also considered if results show that M&A waves are not being 
caused by market timing.  
Two main analyses are conducted: one at the country level and one at the industry 
level. I consider overall M&A activity as well as cross-border M&A activity and 
domestic M&A activity in both analyses. The five industries, as defined by Fama 
French2, are: (1) Consumer and Retail, (2) Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities, (3) 
Technology Media and Telecom, (4) Healthcare and (5) Finance. 
 M&A activity levels are examined through a multiple linear regression analysis 
by studying how M&A levels have fluctuated from 1990 through 2007. This paper uses a 
dummy variable corresponding to crises years and uses control variables indicating 
growth in the economy, corporate governance levels and openness to trade as measured 
by GDP growth rates, corporate governance indices and trade’s   share   of   GDP, 
respectively. Performing the regression analysis and determining the effect and 
significance of the crisis variable provides new empirical evidence as to whether 
depressed markets have a different effect on M&A activity as compared to normal or 
booming years.  
 With regards to the industry analysis, M&A activity levels in each industry 
throughout the seven countries studied is analyzed by performing seemingly unrelated 
regressions with each of the five industries throughout 1990 - 2007. Crises’ effects on 
M&A activity throughout industries provides new empirical evidence as to how different 
industries react to macroeconomic conditions, and particularly as to how foreign buyers                                                         
2 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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and domestic buyers respond to those changing macroeconomic conditions. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide a literature review. In 
Section 3, I provide more details on the unique dataset of Latin American M&A activity. 
In Section 4, I explain the methodology used. In Section 5 I present the main results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
 Most of the literature regarding mergers and acquisitions has focused on studying 
the determinants of domestic deals. Most recently, papers have been written studying the 
determinants of cross-border M&A deals and merger waves. These papers have focused 
on three main ideas: the Neoclassical theory, the Fire Sale and Misvaluation theories and 
the Agency theories.  
The Neoclassical theory focuses on the motivation for firms to invest in another 
country to gain access to new markets and with the purpose of enhancing value. The Fire 
Sale and Misvaluation theories focus on foreign investors taking advantage of companies 
in countries facing bad shocks such as financial crises in order to take advantage of 
distressed targets and on how stock market misvaluations can lead to increased merger 
activity. Agency theories aim at explaining M&A by attributing an increase in activity to 
agency problems in which CEOs value mergers excessively due to empire building and 
corporate diversification in order to enhance the CEOs’   career   prospects   (Makaew,  
2012). With regards to crises in Latin America, there has been a study on FDI being crisis 
preventing in the Latin American region by Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2001), but 
not on how crises affect FDI or M&A. Although the studies in this literature review are 
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related to my work, to the best of my knowledge, there have not been any studies on 
M&A activity during crises periods in the Latin American region at the country and 
industry level.  
Harford (2005) attempts to demonstrate that merger waves are motivated by a 
Neoclassical Hypothesis, which consists in aggregate merger waves being caused by 
technological,  regulatory,  or  economic  shocks  to  an  industry’s  environment,  conditional  
on the availability of capital liquidity, which is signaled by high market valuations as 
measured by the   stock   market’s   market   to   book   value   ratio.   Harford   argues   that   high  
market valuations, which signal the availability of capital liquidity, decrease financial 
constraints, thus making high valuations a good source of liquidity. By combining the 
high market valuation idea, which is a behavioral one, and using it to support the 
Neoclassical industry shocks hypothesis, Harford is able to conclude that aggregate 
merger waves are caused by industry shocks. 
Most papers focusing on the Fire-Sale and Misvaluation theories strengthen the 
idea  that  mergers  are  motivated  by  the  “bargain  hypothesis,”  something  that  I  analyze  in  
this paper. The notion  of  “Fire-Sale  FDI”  was  introduced  by  Krugman (1998) and focuses 
on the idea that during a financial crisis, companies in crisis countries are sold to firms 
from more developed economies at prices lower than fundamental values. Aguiar and 
Ginopath (2005) study the East Asian financial crisis and document an increase in foreign 
acquisitions. Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2011) study the determinants of cross-border 
M&A deals between country pairs by studying several variables such as geography, trade 
within countries, accounting standards, income tax rates, and changes in firm value due to 
countries’   stock   market   valuation   as   well as differences in exchange rates. Most 
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importantly, they determine that the imperfect integration of capital markets leads to a 
merger whenever a highly valued acquirer purchases a relatively inexpensive target, 
following changes in valuation. Their study also demonstrates that holding other things 
constant, geography is an important factor affecting acquisitions between two countries. 
Trade within countries appears to be an important determinant of cross-border activity. 
Countries with good accounting standards tend to have more purchasers, while target 
firms are located in countries that have lower accounting standards. The  study’s  results  
suggest that valuation plays an important role as shown when there are currency 
movements and country-level stock market performance leading to companies in 
wealthier countries to acquire firms in the poorer country when the market of the poorer 
country declines. Differences in valuation as a determinant as demonstrated by these 
channels could mean that as there is an increase in wealth, the cost of capital of the 
acquirer declines as Froot and Stein (1991) demonstrate, or due to the imperfect 
integration of capital markets. Erel Liao and Weisbach (2011) conclude that country-level 
factors such as currency appreciation and macroeconomic performance make acquisitions 
more attractive to the acquiring firm. 
 Similarly, Aminian, Campart and Pfister (2005) sustain that currency collapse and 
large exchange rate depreciation lead to a higher level of M&A activity and an increase 
in   the   wealth   of   the   target   and   acquirer’s   shareholders   around   M&A   announcements.  
Additionally, they explain changes in M&A activity by also looking at the deepening of 
financial markets and expected GDP growth as incentives for investment abroad. Their 
analysis looks at the relationship in deals between European and Asian firms and studies 
factors such as the level of development of a country, the supply and demand forces, the 
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openness of an economy, bilateral trade flows, and the level of exchange rate. The study 
concludes that all factors seem to be significant except GDP growth. Particularly with 
regards to exchange rate depreciation, the authors sustain that financial markets are 
actually   imperfect,   therefore   “as   the   fluctuations   of   exchange   rates   are gradual, ceteris 
paribus,   the   firms’   value   adjustment process is also progressive” (Amininan, Campart 
and Pfister, 2005, pp. 6). The study also highlights the fact that since FDI inflows are 
encouraged by exchange rate depreciation in the depreciating country, they are also 
encouraged during crises in which asset prices sharply fall. 
 Along with the idea of the imperfect integration capital markets, many studies use 
the model and results found by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), in which stock-market-driven 
acquisitions through mispricing lead to firms to use their overvalued equity to make stock 
acquisitions of undervalued or relatively less overvalued companies. The underlying 
assumption in that study is that markets are inefficient and managers, being rational, take 
advantage of mispricing in the market in order to acquire other companies using 
overvalued stock.   
 With regards to the Agency Theory, Jensen (1986) proposes that agency problems 
can   drive   M&A   by   acquirer   companies’   CEOs   valuing   mergers   excessively. Makaew 
(2012, pp. 7), explains the agency theory: 
Mergers can occur in waves because the severity of agency problems varies over 
time. During booms, stock market sentiment tends to be favorable, and the 
lending standard is likely to be lower. There tends to be more funding but less 
monitoring when an economy is expanding. The abundance of free cash flows and 
poor oversight can allow firms to engage in deals that do not create value for 
shareholders. Unproductive acquirers are more likely to obtain M&A financing 
during booms than during busts. 
Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2006) test four hypothesis: two neoclassical and 
two behavioral regarding the cause of merger waves. Starting with the idea that mergers 
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come in waves and that these are correlated with share price increases and increasing 
price-to-earnings multiples, Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2006) look into industry 
shocks, and the q-theory of investment as its two neoclassical hypotheses and into 
overvaluation and managerial discretion as the two behavioral ones. The paper critiques 
Harford’s   (2005) view that merger waves are caused by the industry shock hypothesis. 
The q-theory of investment, which is based on Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) states that 
when firms’ return on capital exceeds its cost  of  capital,  it  acquires  other  firms’  existing  
assets, thus propagating merger waves. Their research into the overvaluation hypothesis 
relies on the Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) assumption that managers take advantage of 
overvalued stock markets to acquire   other   firms’   assets   with   their   own   stock.   With  
regards to the managerial-discretion hypothesis, research is based on Marris (1964, 1998) 
and Mueller (1969) and states that managers pursue growth and not shareholder wealth, 
and that stock market psychology  influences  managers’  decisions.  Gugler,  Mueller,  and  
Yurtoglu (2006) conclude that evidence is in favor of the behavioral hypotheses when 
explaining aggregate merger waves. 
Makaew (2012) incorporates the dynamics of the Neoclassical, Fire-Sale, 
Misvaluation, and Agency theories in order to analyze how the business cycle can explain 
fluctuations in cross-border M&A activity.   Makaew   argues   against   the   “bargain  
hypothesis”   by   showing   that   this   type   of  M&A   activity   is   not   typical   of   cross-border 
mergers, as cross-border M&A activity follows fluctuations in business cycle whereby 
most cross-border mergers occur when both the acquirer and target are in booming 
economies. 
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With regards to Latin American crises, Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2001) 
argue that   foreign   direct   investment   (FDI)   is   a   safer   form   of   financing   as   it   is   “bolted  
down”   and   helps   reduce   the   probability   of   a   crisis.  When   banking   and   currency   crises  
occur,  better  known  as  the  “twin  crises,”  there  is  a  sudden  stop  in  the  capital  inflows  into 
a developing country leading to a loss of access to external finance as shown by Calvo 
and Reinhart (1999). Even though Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2001) do not look 
specifically into M&A, M&A is an important part of FDI and thus it can be argued that 
similar conclusions can be formulated. The argument in favor of the greater safety of FDI 
in financial crises lies in the problem that currency suffers from “original  sin,”  whereby  it 
cannot be used to borrow abroad or long-term domestically, thus favoring a greater 
reliance in equity financing. Their study looks into FDI as being crises-preventing rather 
than at looking at how crises affect FDI (M&A) levels, which is what I analyze in this 
study.  
 
3 Data 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions Data 
 
The M&A sample is taken  from  the  Securities  Data  Corporation’s  (SDC)  Mergers  
and Corporate Transactions database including deals announced between 1990 and 2007 
and completed by the end of 2007. Partial equity-stake purchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest are disregarded. Only deals in which there is an acquisition of a 
majority interest (when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target company before the 
deal and more than 50% after the deal) are considered. From SDC, I collect a number of 
data items for deals including: the transaction value, the announcement date, the 
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completion   date,   the   target’s   name,   its   industry   as   demonstrated   by   the   four-digit SIC 
(Standard Industry Classification) code, the target nation, the name of the acquirer, its 
primary industry and country of domicile.  
Macroeconomic and Crisis Data 
Trade as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth are gathered   from   the  World’s  
Bank World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance database for each 
of the seven countries studied. Trade as a percentage of GDP is used as a control variable 
to measure the openness of each of the seven economies. GDP growth captures the 
growth in the economies of the seven countries studied and is also used as a control 
variable. 
The binary variable indicating crises years is constructed based on Laeven and 
Valencia’s (2012) Systemic Banking Crises Database, which covers the universe of 
systemic banking crises, and also includes data on the timing of currency crises and 
sovereign debt crises. The crisis dummy used takes the value of one whenever there is 
either a systemic banking crisis, a currency crisis or a sovereign debt crisis in each of the 
seven countries. There are a total of seven systemic banking crises, five currency crises 
and one debt crisis. Under my general definition of crises, there are eleven crises3. Given 
the regional nature of some crises, most crises are distributed in the years around 1995 
and 2000. According to Laeven and Valencia (2012): 
[In] a   systemic   banking   crisis,   a   country’s corporate and financial sectors 
experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations 
face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing 
loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is 
exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as 
equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp 
increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows.                                                         
3 Some years have more than one type of crisis at the same time. 
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Building   on   the   approach   in   Frankel   and   Rose   (1996),   we   define   a   “currency  
crisis”  as  a  nominal  depreciation  of  the  currency  of  at  least  30  percent  that  is  also  
at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year 
before. 
We identify and date episodes of sovereign debt default and restructuring by 
relying on information from Beim and Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), and IMF Staff reports. The information 
compiled include year of sovereign defaults to private lending and year of debt 
rescheduling. 
Crises data for the seven Latin American countries can be found in Table 1. 
 
Corporate Governance Data 
As proxies for investor protection and corporate governance, four indices are used 
in this study. Particularly, the quality of accounting standards and rule of law indices 
from La Porta et. al (2002) and quality of institutions4 and risk of expropriation5 from La 
Porta et. al (2012) are used in the model as control variables.  
 Consistent with recent research, using these indices will allow to control for how 
different levels of corporate governance and M&A are related based on the idea that deal 
activity will be stronger in countries with better governance and investor protection. 
These values, shown in Figure 3, do not vary over time for each of the countries. 
 
Industry Data 
For the part of the study focusing on studying the effect of crises on the major 
                                                        
4 The institutional quality index is a variable created from (1) (minus) Informal payments, (2) (minus) 
Ln(Tax days), (3) (minus) Ln(Days without electricity), (4) (minus) Security costs, (5) (minus) Access to 
land, (6) (minus) Access to finance, Government predictability, and (8) (minus) Doing Business percentile 
rank. Higher values indicate better quality of institutions. 
5 Risk of expropriation index is a variable representing  the  risk  of  “outright  confiscation  and  forced  
nationalization”  of  property.  This  variable  ranges  from  zero  to  ten  where  higher  values  are  equals  a  lower  
probability of expropriation. This variable is calculated as the average from 1982 through 1997.  
Rule of law index measures the quality of law enforcement. 
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industries in Latin America relevant SIC codes are classified into five major categories: 
(1) Consumer and Retail, (2) Manufacturing Energy and Utilities, (3) Technology Media 
and Telecom, (4) Healthcare and (5) Finance. This organization of industries is done 
following Fama French’s  classification  of  SIC codes. 
 
4 Methodology 
 
 This study uses a multiple linear regression analysis by assessing whether 
independent variables such as crises indicators lead to an increased M&A volume in 
Latin American countries, while controlling for corporate governance differences, 
openness of the economy as measured by trade as a share of GDP and GDP growth. 
Separate panel datasets are created for the country level analysis and the industry level 
analysis.  
The two variables of interest in each analysis are the average transaction size, 
measured in millions of dollars, and the number of M&A transactions. Variations of these 
variables are created for domestic and cross-border transactions with the purpose of 
measuring how domestic and foreign buyers respond to crises in the target countries 
studied.  
Having panel data allows for the opportunity to analyze how variables, specifically the 
crisis dummy variable, affect M&A activity in the seven countries studied. The 
regression is the following: 
𝑌௖௧ =   𝛼௖௧ + 𝛽ଵ𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠௖௧ + 𝛾𝑋௖௧ + 𝛿𝑋௖ + 𝜀௖௧,  
where Yct measures  the  level  of  M&A  activity  in  country  “c”  and  year  “t.”  𝛽ଵ describes 
the relationship between crises and M&A activity levels. 𝑋௖௧ represents country by year 
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level controls: GDP growth and openness to trade. 𝑋௖ represents country level corporate 
governance indices: rule of law, accounting standards, quality of institutions and risk of 
expropriation.  
 
Hypotheses 
Following my literature review, the two main competing hypotheses tested in this study 
are:   
H0: “Bargain   hypothesis:”   Crisis periods are characterized by low valuation, 
which attracts unconstrained buyers. Under this hypothesis, we should see the 
average transaction value of deals and number of deals increase during a crisis; 
 
H1: “Loss  of  confidence  hypothesis” or  “Financial  constraints”  hypothesis: Crisis 
periods destroy investor confidence or the ability of investors to fund major 
acquisitions. Under both of these hypotheses, crisis periods should lead to a 
decrease in the average transaction value of deals and number of deals. 
 
Failing to reject H0, will provide evidence in the data that unconstrained buyers 
become opportunistic about undervalued firms through acquisitions, thus supporting the 
Fire-Sale and Misvaluation theories. Separate sets of regressions are estimated for 
different versions of the two dependent variables, especially for all transactions, cross-
border and domestic transactions. Regressions with the logs of these dependent variables 
are estimated as well in order to attenuate the effect of potential outliers. Results for 
cross-border transactions are able to provide evidence as to how unconstrained buyers 
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react to crises in Latin America. This analysis is done separately at the country and 
industry levels. 
 
Industry level analysis 
At the industry level, I examine how the main five industries studied react to 
crises in the years from 1990 to 2007 through the use of a seemingly unrelated 
regressions model, SUR.  
Even though five regressions could be estimated for each industry separately, an 
SUR estimation is performed instead in order to take into consideration the potential 
correlation in the error terms of the five different regressions. The dependent variable in 
the SURs is the average transaction value and the number of transactions in each of the 
five industries studied.  Like in the country-level analysis, the SURs are performed for 
variations of the dependent variables to include all transactions, cross-border and 
domestic transactions.  
 
5  Results 
 
Country Level  
 Regressions at the country level (Table 3) with country and year fixed effects 
(Column 1) indicate that the average transaction value decreases by $108.2 million with 
every crisis. The number of transactions decreases by 14.3 (Column 2). These results are 
both significant at the 10% level. Even though statistical significance was lacking when 
looking at domestic and cross-border deals separately (Columns 3 to 6), overall M&A 
activity seems to be significantly affected by crises in the region consistent with the 
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“financing   constraints”   and   “investor   confidence”   hypotheses,   whereby   M&A   activity  
decreases during crises. 
 Table 4 shows regression results at the country level analysis for the logs of the 
same dependent variables tested in Table 3. Even though the negative sign is preserved 
for the crisis variable as in the regressions without logs, the results are not statistically 
significant. 
Industry Level – Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Average Transaction Value) 
 The results for the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for the Industry Level 
analysis are presented in Tables 5 to 16. In Table 5, results for the average transaction 
value with no fixed effects are presented for all (domestic and cross-border) transactions. 
These results are statistically significant for the Finance industry only, for which there is 
a decrease in the average transaction value of M&A deals of $186.2 million with every 
crisis (Column 5). In Table 6 regression results with country and year fixed effects are 
shown for all transactions. The crisis dummy variable is significant at the 1% level for the 
Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities and Finance industries (Columns 2 and 5, 
respectively). The results show that during a crisis year, the average transaction value in 
the Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities industry decreases by $245.7 million and by 
$230.9 million in the Finance industry.  
For the SUR for average transaction value for cross-border deals with no fixed 
effects, the negative sign of the crisis variables is preserved for all industries (Table 7). 
However, the results are not statistically significant in this case. The SUR results for 
cross-border deals with country and year fixed effects shows that the effect of a crisis on 
average transaction value in the Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities (Column 2) as well 
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as the Finance industries (Column 5) are significant at the 5% level with the coefficient 
still negative, but with a slightly lower magnitude (Table 8). Tables 9 and 10 present 
SUR results for average transaction value for domestic deals with no fixed effects and 
with country and year fixed effects, respectively. As in the previous tables, the effect of a 
crisis on M&A activity continues to be negative, but statistical significance is absent.  
Industry Level – Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Transaction Number) 
 The SURs for  number of transactions for all deals without fixed effects provides 
results that are not statistically significant (Table 11). Table 12 presents the SUR results 
for the number of all transactions for all deals with country and year fixed effects. The 
crisis variable is significant at the 1% level for the Consumer and Retail, Healthcare and 
Finance industries (Columns 1, 4 and 5). This variable is significant at the 5% level for 
the Technology, Media and Telecommunications industry (Column 3). The coefficient is 
negative for these four industries, indicating that a crisis leads to fewer M&A 
transactions. The Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities industry although not significant, 
presents a positive reaction to crises (Column 2). The Finance industry presents the 
greatest reaction to a crisis, with the number of transactions decreasing by 16.5 in this 
industry (Column 5).  
 The SUR for transaction number in cross-border deals with no fixed effects does 
not have results that are statistically significant (Table 13). When looking at the number 
of transactions for the SUR with cross-border deals with country and year fixed effects 
(Table 14), I find that the number of transactions increases with a crisis in the 
Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities industry by 3.2 transactions (Column 2). This is in 
contrast with the Finance industry, in which the number of transactions decreases by 6.6 
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whenever there is a crisis (Column 5). Both of these results are significant at the 1% 
level. The number of transactions decreases by 1.3 in the Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications industry (Column 3), with this result being statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Both the Consumer and Retail and the Healthcare industries (Columns 1 
and 4, respectively) present positive coefficients, however, these results are not 
statistically significant.  
 The SUR for transaction number for domestic deals with no fixed effects does not 
have results that are statistically significant (Table 15). The crisis variable has a negative 
coefficient in all cases. For the SUR for transaction number for domestic deals with 
country and year fixed effects, the number of transactions during a crisis decreases in all 
industries (Table 16). The industry that is mostly affected is the Finance industry, in 
which the number of transactions decreases by about 9.9 whenever there is a crisis 
(Column 5). The number of transactions in the Consumer and Retail and Healthcare 
industries (Columns 1 and 4, respectively) decreases by 8.4 and 2.1 whenever there is a 
crisis. Results for these three industries are significant at the 1% level. The 
Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities and Technology, Media and Telecommunications 
industries (Columns 2 and 3, respectively), maintain the negative effect of crisis in terms 
of deal activity, but these results are not statistically significant.  
  
6 Conclusions 
 
In this study, I provide an analysis of the changes in M&A activity in Latin 
American countries from 1990 to 2007. The study focuses on the effects of systemic 
financial crises in the region. Most recent studies in the field have focused on the 
 20 
determinants of cross-border M&A in which they look specifically into corporate 
governance variables as well as into neoclassical and behavior hypotheses in motivating 
M&A activity across firms. With regards to crises in Latin America, studies have focused 
on FDI, instead of M&A. This paper analyzes all, cross-border and domestic deals at both 
the country and industry level to determine how M&A deal activity reacts to crises 
periods. 
 My results are mostly consistent with the “financing   constraints”   and   “loss   of  
investor   confidence”   hypotheses   during   crises   as   seen   by   the overall decrease in the 
average transaction value and number of transactions at both the country and industry 
level. Evidence   of   “market   timing”   is   scant.   This result reinforces the Neoclassical 
Hypothesis, which suggests that mergers and acquisitions follow the business cycle in 
terms of M&A activity during crises. 
 At the industry level, I find an interesting result. Even though my country-level 
results show that the average transaction value decreases in all industries, the “Fire-Sale”/ 
“market timing” hypothesis cannot be rejected in the Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities 
industry, in which I observe a rise in the number of deals despite the average transaction 
value decreasing within those industries during crises. This fact suggests that in these 
industries, investors are taking advantage of undervalued companies by engaging in a 
greater number of lower valued acquisition targets. Lastly, it is noteworthy to see that the 
Finance industry results are consistent with the country-level results whereby I find a 
significant reduction in M&A activity in times of crises. 
The Manufacturing, Energy and Utilities industries comprise a significant portion 
of M&A deal volume form 1990 through 2007 and hence serve as an important counter-
 21 
balance to my main country-level results, which showed a significant drop in M&A 
activity during crisis. My country level result consistent  with   the  “financing  constraint”  
hypothesis does not apply homogenously to all industries in the region. Future research 
should investigate the causes behind this differential effect of crises across different 
industries. 
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Figure 1 
Domestic and cross-border aggregate M&A deal volume across Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela from 1990 to 2007. 
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Figure 2 
M&A deal activity classified by industry based on aggregate deal volume from 1990 to 2007 for Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. 
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Table 2 – Corporate Governance Indicators 
Rule of Law an Accounting Standards are from La Porta et. al. (2002). Quality of Institutions and Risk of 
Expropriation are from La Porta et. al. (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Timing of Crises 
From Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update (Laeven and Valencia 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Country 
Systemic Banking 
Crisis Currency Crisis 
Debt 
Crisis 
Debt 
Restructuring 
Argentina 
1980, 1989, 1995, 
2001 1975, 1981, 1987, 2002 1982, 2001 1993, 2005 
Brazil 1990, 1994 
1976, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1999 1983 1994 
Chile 1976, 1981 1972, 1982 1983 1990 
Colombia 1982, 1998 1985 NA NA 
Mexico 1981, 1994 1977, 1982, 1995 1982 1990 
Peru 1983 1976, 1981, 1988 1978 1996 
Venezuela 1994 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000 1982 1990 
Country Rule of Law 
Accounting 
Standards Quality of Institutions 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
Chile 7.0 52.0 0.3 7.8 
Argentina 5.4 45.0 -0.5 6.3 
Mexico 5.4 60.0 0.3 7.5 
Brazil 6.3 54.0 -0.6 7.9 
Venezuela 6.4 40.0 0.2 7.1 
Colombia 2.1 50.0 0.0 7.4 
Peru 2.5 38.0 -0.1 6.2 
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Table 3 – Country Level Analysis 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Average 
Transaction Value 
Number of 
Transactions 
Average Cross-
Border Transaction 
Value 
Number of Cross-
Border Transactions 
Average 
Domestic 
Transaction 
Value 
Number of Domestic 
Transactions 
              
GDP Growth -5.005 -0.381 -1.086 -0.264 -3.919 -0.117 
 
(4.214) (0.523) (2.180) (0.223) (3.724) (0.406) 
Trade/GDP -2.803 -0.280 0.752 0.0134 -3.555* -0.293 
 
(2.320) (0.288) (1.200) (0.123) (2.050) (0.223) 
Crisis Dummy -108.2* -14.32* -35.73 -4.985 -72.51 -9.332 
 
(59.58) (7.400) (30.82) (3.153) (52.65) (5.738) 
Rule of Law 10.32 6.321*** -6.681 1.842*** 17.00* 2.895*** 
 
(10.43) (1.388) (5.396) (0.552) (9.217) (1.005) 
Accounting 
Standards 7.790*** 1.703*** 0.796 0.969*** 6.994*** 0.827*** 
 
(2.916) (0.345) (1.508) (0.154) (2.577) (0.281) 
Quality of 
Institutions 7.871 -26.34** -72.55 -4.680 80.42 -1.553 
 
(135.2) (11.60) (69.93) (7.155) (119.5) (13.02) 
Risk of 
Expropriation -6.232 -2.493 32.77 -9.183** -39.00 -7.625 
 
(67.03) (4.622) (34.67) (3.547) (59.23) (6.456) 
Constant 103.6 -83.22*** -138.1 10.50 241.7 10.37 
 
(411.2) (30.11) (212.7) (21.76) (363.3) (39.60) 
       Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.311 0.666 0.276 0.674 0.258 0.538 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Observations are grouped by country. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Country Level Analysis (Logs) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Log 
Average 
Transaction 
Value 
Log Transaction 
Number 
Log Average Cross-
Border Transaction 
Value 
Log Cross-Border 
Transaction 
Number 
Log Average 
Domestic 
Transaction 
Value 
Log Domestic 
Transaction Number 
              
GDP Growth 0.012 -0.0142 -0.0222 -0.0113 0.0755* -0.0168 
 
-0.0247 -0.0162 (0.0315) (0.0182) (0.0408) (0.0163) 
Trade/GDP -0.0244* 0.0208** 0.00553 0.00903 -0.0623*** 0.0316*** 
 
-0.0136 -0.00844 (0.0173) (0.00947) (0.0225) (0.00848) 
Crisis Dummy -0.303 -0.405 -0.434 -0.397 0.00533 -0.346 
 
-0.349 -0.252 (0.445) (0.282) (0.577) (0.253) 
Rule of Law 0.0477 0.140*** -0.0653 0.199*** 0.260** 0.0719 
 
-0.061 -0.0451 (0.0779) (0.0506) (0.101) (0.0453) 
Accounting 
Standards 0.0712*** 0.0897*** 0.0413* 0.0872*** 0.125*** 0.0809*** 
 
-0.0171 -0.0129 (0.0218) (0.0145) (0.0282) (0.0130) 
Quality of 
Institutions 0.498 -1.822*** -0.374 -1.665*** 2.127 -1.892*** 
 
-0.791 -0.368 (1.010) (0.413) (1.308) (0.369) 
Risk of 
Expropriation -0.355 -0.673*** -0.329 -0.625*** -0.983 -0.630*** 
 
-0.392 -0.169 (0.501) (0.189) (0.649) (0.169) 
Constant 4.607* 1.737** 4.352 0.957 4.451 1.125 
 
-2.406 -0.871 (3.072) (0.977) (3.980) (0.875) 
       Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.375 0.487 0.336 0.478 0.397 0.407 
Country FE Y N Y N Y N 
Year FE Y N Y N Y N 
 
Observations are grouped by country. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for All Deals – No Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing, 
Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 6.841 -29.41*** -6.645 -2.474 -20.31** 
 
(4.237) (10.54) (9.823) (4.886) (10.15) 
Trade/GDP -0.0728 2.845 -1.155 -0.0965 1.251 
 
(1.519) (3.777) (3.521) (1.751) (3.637) 
Crisis Dummy -23.24 -112.8 -153.8 -20.13 -186.2* 
 
(42.73) (106.3) (99.08) (49.28) (102.3) 
Rule of Law -70.19 311.8** -100.1 22.02 -96.92 
 
(60.74) (151.1) (140.8) (70.05) (145.5) 
Accounting 
Standards -9.325 42.23** 0.299 -9.156 5.255 
 
(8.198) (20.39) (19.01) (9.453) (19.63) 
Quality of 
Institutions 85.61 -288.3** -58.60 95.47 1.720 
 
(54.55) (135.7) (126.5) (62.91) (130.6) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 137.5 -541.8** 107.2 59.86 69.54 
 
(101.2) (251.7) (234.6) (116.7) (242.4) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.302 0.290 0.182 0.218 0.289 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for All Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
Consumer and 
Retail 
Manufacturing, Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth -14.80** -37.44* -1.067 21.49* 7.231 
 
(7.075) (22.67) (10.11) (12.19) (22.71) 
Trade/GDP 6.052* -4.363 6.674 -10.16* -17.92* 
 
(3.233) (10.36) (4.619) (5.569) (10.38) 
Crisis Dummy 3.062 -245.7*** -51.26 -64.65 -230.9*** 
 
(27.90) (89.41) (39.87) (48.06) (89.57) 
Rule of Law 21.16* 55.08 -29.30 50.64** -63.98 
 
(12.81) (41.06) (18.31) (22.07) (41.13) 
Accounting Standards -1.337 1.900 -0.0453 -1.703 21.63*** 
 
(1.560) (5.000) (2.229) (2.688) (5.009) 
Quality of Institutions -120.4 -41.63 -292.8* 420.1** 595.0* 
 
(110.2) (353.3) (157.5) (189.9) (353.9) 
Risk of Expropriation 
     
      Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.789 0.643 0.906 0.472 0.613 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for Cross Border Deals – No Fixed Effects 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing, 
Energy and Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 2.325 -28.50*** -2.361 -1.577 -26.75*** 
 
(3.301) (10.08) (7.570) (4.701) (9.319) 
Trade/GDP 1.323 1.660 2.227 0.0907 6.463* 
 
(1.183) (3.615) (2.713) (1.685) (3.340) 
Crisis Dummy -6.387 -92.27 -43.70 -1.033 -92.71 
 
(33.30) (101.7) (76.35) (47.42) (94.00) 
Rule of Law -82.04* 356.0** -7.940 54.16 -89.48 
 
(47.33) (144.6) (108.5) (67.40) (133.6) 
Accounting 
Standards -7.473 44.46** 2.555 -5.277 2.304 
 
(6.388) (19.51) (14.65) (9.096) (18.03) 
Quality of 
Institutions -15.18 -226.1* -147.7 92.79 -161.8 
 
(42.51) (129.8) (97.46) (60.53) (120.0) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 118.7 -593.7** -17.13 2.687 43.65 
 
(78.86) (240.9) (180.8) (112.3) (222.6) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.188 0.315 0.084 0.239 0.281 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for Cross-Border Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing, 
Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth -19.15*** -42.52** -12.03 22.19** -13.27 
 
(4.689) (21.09) (11.43) (11.25) (22.57) 
Trade/GDP 8.374*** -2.868 8.674* -8.793* -10.53 
 
(2.143) (9.639) (5.221) (5.138) (10.31) 
Crisis Dummy 1.859 -204.0** 6.325 -42.71 -209.3** 
 
(18.49) (83.19) (45.06) (44.35) (89.01) 
Rule of Law 2.471 84.32** -9.612 51.09** -95.16** 
 
(8.492) (38.20) (20.69) (20.36) (40.87) 
Accounting 
Standards -1.742* -1.071 -1.912 -2.575 14.13*** 
 
(1.034) (4.652) (2.520) (2.480) (4.978) 
Quality of 
Institutions -253.5*** -75.67 -343.4* 370.7** 463.5 
 
(73.07) (328.7) (178.0) (175.2) (351.7) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
     
      Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.822 0.675 0.774 0.527 0.542 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for Domestic Deals – No Fixed Effects 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing, 
Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 4.516 -0.908 -4.284 -0.897 6.439 
 
(3.309) (3.469) (8.106) (1.599) (5.323) 
Trade/GDP -1.396 1.185 -3.381 -0.187 -5.212*** 
 
(1.186) (1.244) (2.905) (0.573) (1.908) 
Crisis Dummy -16.85 -20.51 -110.1 -19.09 -93.53* 
 
(33.38) (34.99) (81.76) (16.13) (53.69) 
Rule of Law 11.85 -44.17 -92.12 -32.14 -7.441 
 
(47.44) (49.74) (116.2) (22.92) (76.32) 
Accounting 
Standards -1.852 -2.224 -2.256 -3.879 2.950 
 
(6.403) (6.713) (15.68) (3.094) (10.30) 
Quality of 
Institutions 100.8** -62.18 89.07 2.688 163.5** 
 
(42.61) (44.67) (104.4) (20.59) (68.54) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 18.87 51.85 124.3 57.17 25.89 
 
(79.04) (82.87) (193.6) (38.19) (127.2) 
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.237 0.109 0.221 0.210 0.330 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 – SUR for Average Transaction Value for Domestic Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
        (1) (2) (3) (59) (60) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing, 
Energy and Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 4.345 5.085 10.96 -0.698 20.51*** 
 
(7.374) (8.658) (12.00) (3.600) (4.618) 
Trade/GDP -2.323 -1.495 -2.000 -1.367 -7.390*** 
 
(3.370) (3.956) (5.482) (1.645) (2.110) 
Crisis Dummy 1.203 -41.76 -57.59 -21.95 -21.58 
 
(29.08) (34.14) (47.32) (14.20) (18.21) 
Rule of Law 18.69 -29.24* -19.69 -0.456 31.18*** 
 
(13.35) (15.68) (21.73) (6.519) (8.364) 
Accounting 
Standards 0.405 2.970 1.866 0.872 7.506*** 
 
(1.626) (1.909) (2.646) (0.794) (1.019) 
Quality of 
Institutions 133.0 34.04 50.57 49.33 131.5* 
 
(114.9) (134.9) (187.0) (56.09) (71.97) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.589 0.398 0.815 0.566 0.945 
     Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Table 11 – SUR for Transaction Number for All Deals – No Fixed Effects 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing Energy 
and Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth -0.246 0.245 -0.230 0.0201 -0.686 
 
(0.558) (0.452) (0.339) (0.118) (0.733) 
Trade/GDP -0.326*** -0.389*** -0.155** -0.0526** -0.194 
 
(0.122) (0.0989) (0.0742) (0.0257) (0.160) 
Crisis Dummy -5.699 0.252 -3.999 -0.915 -14.10* 
 
(5.845) (4.735) (3.553) (1.233) (7.679) 
Rule of Law 1.395 2.845 2.525 0.513 4.397 
 
(2.807) (2.274) (1.706) (0.592) (3.688) 
Accounting Standards 0.235 0.305 0.0942 0.0507 0.229 
 
(0.320) (0.259) (0.194) (0.0674) (0.420) 
Quality of Institutions 
     
      Risk of Expropriation 
     
      Constant 4.737 -7.841 -6.802 -1.610 -10.04 
 
(20.85) (16.89) (12.67) (4.397) (27.39) 
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.262 0.400 0.262 0.170 0.211 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 – SUR for Transaction Number for All Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing 
Energy and Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 2.706*** 1.522*** 0.972* 0.364** 2.369** 
 
-0.733 -0.387 -0.571 -0.16 -0.948 
Trade/GDP -2.048*** -0.781*** -0.747*** -0.457*** -2.053*** 
 
-0.335 -0.177 -0.261 -0.0733 -0.433 
Crisis Dummy -7.700*** 0.441 -4.714** -1.921*** -16.52*** 
 
-2.891 -1.525 -2.252 -0.633 -3.741 
Rule of Law -27.91*** -9.628*** -10.38** -7.296*** -33.63*** 
 
-5.791 -3.055 -4.512 -1.267 -7.494 
Accounting 
Standards 3.635*** 1.262*** 1.337** 0.928*** 4.126*** 
 
-0.673 -0.355 -0.524 -0.147 -0.871 
Quality of 
Institutions 
     
      Risk of 
Expropriation 
     
      Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.873 0.956 0.792 0.846 0.868 
 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 – SUR for Transaction Number for Cross-Border Deals – No Fixed Effects 
 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
Consumer and 
Retail 
Manufacturing Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth -0.0769 -0.195 -0.294*** 0.0266 -0.782*** 
 
(0.194) (0.204) (0.0937) (0.0497) (0.270) 
Trade/GDP -0.00706 -0.0120 0.0400 -0.00857 0.240** 
 
(0.0696) (0.0732) (0.0336) (0.0178) (0.0966) 
Crisis Dummy 0.821 2.475 -1.034 0.350 -4.345 
 
(1.958) (2.061) (0.945) (0.502) (2.719) 
Rule of Law -4.425 -1.006 2.696** 0.962 -2.791 
 
(2.783) (2.929) (1.343) (0.713) (3.864) 
Accounting Standards -0.495 -0.0265 0.359** 0.176* -0.155 
 
(0.376) (0.395) (0.181) (0.0962) (0.522) 
Quality of Institutions -4.065 -5.151* -2.756** -0.918 -10.49*** 
 
(2.500) (2.630) (1.206) (0.640) (3.470) 
Risk of Expropriation 7.702* 1.647 -4.582** -1.913 3.296 
 
(4.637) (4.880) (2.237) (1.188) (6.438) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.444 0.408 0.299 0.142 0.345 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 14 – SUR for Transaction Number for Cross-Border Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 0.410 0.0858 -0.219 0.438*** 0.583* 
 
(0.335) (0.255) (0.192) (0.0505) (0.344) 
Trade/GDP -0.297* -0.0108 0.137 -0.219*** -0.450*** 
 
(0.153) (0.116) (0.0877) (0.0231) (0.157) 
Crisis Dummy 0.657 3.248*** -1.325* 0.209 -6.631*** 
 
(1.320) (1.005) (0.757) (0.199) (1.358) 
Rule of Law 0.506 -0.772* 0.256 -0.218** -0.689 
 
(0.606) (0.461) (0.348) (0.0914) (0.624) 
Accounting 
Standards 0.141* 0.131** -0.0451 0.0955*** 0.247*** 
 
(0.0738) (0.0562) (0.0423) (0.0111) (0.0760) 
Quality of 
Institutions 4.077 -6.116 -6.407** 5.579*** 10.96** 
 
(5.217) (3.970) (2.992) (0.786) (5.367) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
     
      Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.821 0.900 0.680 0.904 0.884 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 15 – SUR for Transaction Number for Domestic Deals – No Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing Energy 
and Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth -0.501 0.0908 -0.134 -0.0616 -0.335 
 
(0.417) (0.297) (0.315) (0.102) (0.526) 
Trade/GDP 0.0161 -0.0249 0.00439 0.0115 0.000533 
 
(0.149) (0.107) (0.113) (0.0366) (0.188) 
Crisis Dummy -5.301 -0.941 -2.239 -1.063 -8.173 
 
(4.205) (3.000) (3.177) (1.030) (5.301) 
Rule of Law -2.782 -10.11** -8.982** -2.794* -10.18 
 
(5.977) (4.264) (4.516) (1.464) (7.535) 
Accounting 
Standards 0.00972 -1.142** -1.231** -0.378* -1.455 
 
(0.807) (0.576) (0.609) (0.198) (1.017) 
Quality of 
Institutions -8.722 -5.474 -2.742 -0.675 -2.535 
 
(5.367) (3.830) (4.056) (1.314) (6.767) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 3.109 17.17** 16.61** 5.097** 20.13 
 
(9.958) (7.105) (7.524) (2.439) (12.55) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.261 0.499 0.362 0.293 0.286 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 16 – SUR for Transaction Number for Domestic Deals – Country and Year Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Consumer and Retail 
Manufacturing 
Energy and 
Utilities 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Healthcare Finance 
            
GDP Growth 2.296*** 1.436*** 1.191** -0.0741 1.785** 
 
(0.595) (0.451) (0.531) (0.164) (0.833) 
Trade/GDP -1.751*** -0.771*** -0.884*** -0.239*** -1.603*** 
 
(0.272) (0.206) (0.243) (0.0750) (0.380) 
Crisis Dummy -8.357*** -2.807 -3.389 -2.129*** -9.891*** 
 
(2.348) (1.779) (2.095) (0.648) (3.284) 
Rule of Law -0.118 -0.911 0.782 0.582* 0.925 
 
(1.078) (0.817) (0.962) (0.297) (1.508) 
Accounting 
Standards 0.708*** 0.349*** 0.258** 0.0788** 0.544*** 
 
(0.131) (0.0995) (0.117) (0.0362) (0.184) 
Quality of 
Institutions 51.38*** 21.69*** 28.78*** 9.430*** 55.40*** 
 
(9.276) (7.031) (8.276) (2.559) (12.98) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
     
      Constant 
     
      
      Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.836 0.875 0.803 0.801 0.806 
 
Observations are grouped by industry. T-statistics are computed and are shown in each column. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
